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May 13, 1989:
I sat in a cave, one of a multitude of prisoners. For dinner, as for so 
many other meals, we were served steak. Tendrils of steam rose from 
our plates like beckoning fingers. The aroma penetrated our nostrils; 
our mouths watered. We took a bite: the meat was so tender that it 
practically melted on our tongues. We groaned with pleasure. Where 
the meat came from we didn’t know—and didn’t care. We simply 
reveled in the flavor, the texture, the juice dribbling down our chins. 
We were content in our cave. It didn’t occur to us to attempt escape.
 I sat in a spacious banquet hall, one of a multitude of 
friends and family attending the wedding reception. I no longer 
recall the meal that was served, except that the entrée was some 
kind of meat—steak, perhaps. My mind wasn’t on the meal, 
though. I was more concerned with the toast that I, as the best 
man, was expected to give after the meal. My younger brother—
who was the groom, and a longtime Trekker—had dared me 
to raise my glass, give the Vulcan salute, and, in front of the 
onlooking crowd, say, “Live long and prosper!” Part of me was 
tempted, but I knew I’d chicken out. Actually, I was hoping I 
could find someone willing to give the toast in my place. I never 
felt comfortable giving toasts.
My brother had some vegan friends—they were a couple—who 
were sitting at the same table I was. Special care had been taken 
to serve them a vegan meal, but the catering service had goofed: 
their green beans were coated with butter. The two vegans took 
exception. The rights of animals, they complained, had been 
violated, and at their expense. They refused to eat not only the 
green beans but the rest of their meal as well. Some of the dinner 
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guests grumbled. It was inappropriate, they thought, to use my 
brother’s wedding as a platform for their animal rights agenda. 
The two vegans seemed to care more about animals than about 
the happy couple.
As far as I know, however, the episode didn’t bother my brother 
and his bride, even though they weren’t animal rights advocates. 
Neither was I bothered. In fact, I was delighted by the distraction. 
It gave me something to think about other than the impending 
toast. I was aware, of course, that an animal rights movement 
lurked out there somewhere, but I knew virtually nothing 
about it. Somehow, I had never studied the arguments for or 
against animal rights—even though I was going for a Ph.D. in 
Philosophy, and specialized in Ethics. Nonetheless, with a hunk 
of meat sitting on my plate, I thought I should say something in 
defense of meat.
“But at least the animals people eat have a life. If we didn’t 
eat them, we wouldn’t raise them, and if we didn’t raise them, 
they’d never exist.” This was the best I could think of. If I had 
known about it, I might have quoted Leslie Stephen, the father 
of Virginia Woolf, who made the same point I did, only more 
eloquently: “Of all the arguments for Vegetarianism none is so 
weak as the argument from humanity.  The pig has a stronger 
interest than anyone in the demand for bacon.  If all the world 
were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all.”
My brother’s vegan friends jumped all over me. They spoke at 
length about factory farming—the crowded conditions, the 
cages, the growth hormones, and on and on. Food animals, they 
said, were treated so inhumanely that nonexistence would be 
preferable to the kind of life they lived. I wasn’t sure how to 
respond, because I knew nothing about factory farming. Where 
my meat came from I didn’t know—and didn’t care. I simply 
reveled in the flavor, the texture, the juice dribbling down my 
chin.
I was content in my cave.
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�
Summer, 1991:
A man came to visit me in the cave. He was middle-aged, slim, and 
wore glasses. Speaking with an Australian accent, he told me to turn 
around. I had spent my whole life in the cave, and, during all that 
time, I had never once turned around. Why should I have? Everything 
I needed, everything I wanted, was right in front of me. When I didn’t 
move, the man grabbed me by my collar, lifted me to my feet, and 
forced me to turn around. In the distance was a bright light. The light 
hurt my eyes, so I covered them. The man told me about the light. 
He said that it was the entrance to the cave. Outside the cave was a 
world I knew nothing about, a world of equality, a beautiful world. I 
should strive to reach that world, the man said. His arguments were 
powerful, but, as my eyes began to adjust to the brightness, I could see 
that reaching the outside world would be difficult: the ascent was steep 
and rugged. Staying put would be so much easier. What should I do? 
I needed time to think.
I opened the book to Chapter One. “All Animals Are Equal,” 
I read. All animals are equal? Was this guy serious? If this was 
what animal advocates believed, they must be full of baloney.
Ordinarily, I wouldn’t have picked up the book. I was interested 
in women’s rights, not animal rights. During the summer of 1991, 
my top priority was my Ph.D. dissertation—I was writing about 
feminist ethics. Ph.D. dissertations, though, don’t pay the bills, 
so I also did some teaching, a couple of courses each semester. In 
the fall, I’d be teaching an introductory course in applied ethics. 
I’d already taught the course several times. I was growing weary 
of topics such as abortion, the death penalty, and euthanasia. I 
wanted to try something new. I flipped through the text I’d be 
using for the course. It had a section on animal rights. Perhaps I 
could teach that. The problem was that I knew next to nothing 
about animal rights. If I was going to teach the topic, I’d need to 
do some research.
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I soon discovered that, in 1975, the Australian philosopher Peter 
Singer had written a book called Animal Liberation, and that this 
book had helped launch the modern animal movement. Fifteen 
years later, in 1990, Singer had written a second edition of the 
book. I decided to start with that.
I found the book in the school library. Every few days, I walked to 
the library from my apartment—a distance of a mile and a half—
to read a chapter of the book. I finished the book in a couple of 
weeks. The first chapter of the book, titled “All Animals Are 
Equal,” provided a philosophical rationale for the liberation of 
animals. To my astonishment, I found myself on the defensive.
By his claim that all animals are equal, Singer meant that the 
interests of a nonhuman animal have the same value as the 
comparable interests of a human being. Animals as well as human 
beings have interests. A cow, for instance, like a human being, 
has an interest in receiving pleasure and avoiding pain. Suppose, 
then, that we inflict massive suffering on a cow in order to give 
a human being a trifling pleasure. According to Singer, this is 
morally wrong, because it violates the principle of the equality of 
all animals. Someone who violates this principle is a speciesist. 
Speciesists believe that the interests of a nonhuman animal have 
less value than the comparable interests of a human being.
Most human beings, as Singer pointed out, are speciesists. I 
myself was a speciesist. But if speciesism were defensible, two 
statements would have to be true: 1) that human beings possess 
something that nonhuman animals lack, or that human beings 
possess more of something than nonhuman animals do, and 2) 
that this thing, whatever it turns out to be, increases the value of 
interests. If no such thing separated us from the other animals, 
we would have no basis for preferring our interests over theirs. 
Does such a thing exist?
Many have thought so. Human beings, for instance, are 
more intelligent. We also use language, transmit culture, and 
understand moral concepts such as duty, virtue, right, and wrong. 
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There seems to be no end to the characteristics that separate us 
from the other animals.
However, as Singer argued, none of these characteristics 
increases the value of interests. Consider intelligence. A newborn 
baby, or a very severely brain-damaged person, is less intelligent 
than I am—indeed, is less intelligent than even a chimpanzee. 
If, then, intelligence was the characteristic that increased the 
value of interests, we’d be forced to conclude that the interests 
of a newborn baby, or of a very severely brain-damaged person, 
have less value than my comparable interests, or the comparable 
interests of a chimpanzee. This conclusion, however, is surely 
false. Therefore, intelligence doesn’t increase the value of 
interests.
The same reasoning holds for the other characteristics too. 
Newborn babies and very severely brain-damaged people don’t 
use language, don’t transmit culture, and don’t understand moral 
concepts. Yet their interests count as much as anyone else’s 
comparable interests.
It appears, then, that nothing exists that only human beings 
possess, or that human beings possess more of than nonhuman 
animals do, and that increases the value of interests. But since 
no such thing exists, speciesism isn’t defensible. Since speciesism 
isn’t defensible, all animals are equal.
This argument struck me as powerful, as did other arguments 
that Singer advanced. But, I thought to myself, even if all animals 
are equal, what follows? Will I, for example, need to change my 
diet? If so, how? The answers to these questions were far from 
obvious.
I continued to read Singer’s book. Chapter Three described 
in detail what happens on factory farms. From this chapter, 
I learned that everything my brother’s vegan friends had said 
two years earlier was true. Animals raised on factory farms are 
treated abominably. If all animals are equal, this treatment must 
be highly unethical. Buying and consuming meat that comes 
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from factory farms must likewise be unethical. But practically 
all of the meat I ate came from factory farms. Thus, if Singer 
was right—as he seemed to be—I would need to modify my diet 
significantly.
I wasn’t, however, eager to do so. I liked my diet the way it 
was—the food I ate was so tasty. Perhaps, I thought to myself, I 
shouldn’t act hastily. Just because I couldn’t find a flaw in Singer’s 
arguments didn’t mean there was no flaw. Singer’s arguments 
were complex. I may have overlooked a flaw that was there.
I needed time to think. I wasn’t yet ready to leave the cave.
�
July 31-August 1, 1992:
I’d been thinking for more than a year. Finally, I was ready to leave 
the cave. But as I gazed toward the entrance, I saw not just one 
passage but many. Each was attractive in its way. Which one should 
I take? Did they all lead to the entrance? It was hard to tell, because 
the cave was dark. Then I realized something. Taking any of the 
passages was better than remaining where I was. So, hoping for the 
best, I picked what seemed to me the best passage. If it didn’t work 
out, I could always try another. I climbed toward the entrance.
I lifted the sandwich, cut in half along the diagonal, to my lips 
and took a bite. It was simple food: half a can of tuna, a dollop 
of mayonnaise, and thinly sliced celery all mixed together and 
spread between two slices of toast. Over the years, I had eaten 
many such sandwiches, and I’d always enjoyed them. I had liked 
the flakiness of the tuna, the tang of the mayonnaise, and the 
crunch of the celery. But although this sandwich tasted exactly 
the same as all the others, something was different. I forced 
myself to swallow. The only reason I ate the sandwich was that 
I still had half a can of tuna. If I hadn’t eaten the sandwich, I 
would have ended up throwing out the tuna, and that seemed 
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pointless. I was happy when all that remained of the sandwich 
were a few crumbs of toast scattered on a plate. Never again 
would I eat a tuna sandwich.
I’d been thinking for more than a year. Somewhere along the 
way, I decided that Peter Singer was right. I had to make changes 
in my diet. But how far should I go? Many changes were possible, 
and each was attractive in its way. I seriously considered the 
following options:
1. Becoming a conscientious omnivore. Conscientious omnivores 
eat meat, eggs, and dairy, but only when these products come 
from animals who are reared and slaughtered humanely. Free-
range chicken and cage-free eggs are acceptable; factory-farmed 
products are not.
2. Becoming a pescetarian. Pescetarians eat seafood but not 
other kinds of meat. If I became a pescetarian, I’d prefer wild-
caught fish over farmed fish. I’d also eat bivalves, such as clams, 
because they appear to lack consciousness and the ability to feel 
pain. Anything that lacks consciousness doesn’t have interests, 
and so I wouldn’t need to take its interests into account when 
deciding what to eat.
3. Becoming a lacto-ovo vegetarian. Lacto-ovo vegetarians eat 
eggs and dairy but not meat of any kind, including seafood. 
Meat is problematic because the only way to get it is by killing 
an animal. If I became a lacto-ovo vegetarian, I’d try to buy eggs 
and dairy that came from humanely treated animals.
4. Becoming a vegan. Vegans refrain from all animal products, 
usually even honey. Even when we treat food animals humanely, 
we still use them as mere means—means to satisfy our palates—
and this, according to vegans, is impermissible.
I didn’t know which of these options to choose, and so for a long 
time I didn’t choose any. Then I realized something. Choosing 
any of these options was better than choosing none. So, hoping 
for the best, I picked what seemed to me the best option. If it 
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didn’t prove satisfactory, I could always try another. On August 
1, 1992, the day after I ate the tuna sandwich, I became a lacto-
ovo vegetarian.
�
August, 1992:
I stood at the entrance to the cave, peering into the outside world. 
The light out there was so bright that I had to shield my eyes. I could 
see hardly anything, only bits and pieces. I saw enough, however, to 
know that the man with the Australian accent had been right: the 
outside world was a world of equality, a beautiful world. I looked 
back inside the cave. In the distance, at the bottom of the cave, sat all 
the prisoners. They were my family and must be missing me. I needed 
to tell them where I’d been. As I descended into the cave, I wondered 
how they’d react. Would they give me their blessing? Would any of 
them join me?
About a week before my fall semester began, I visited my parents 
in Maine. That was when I broke the news that I’d become a 
vegetarian. My parents were surprised, but accepting. They had 
always accepted their children’s choices in life, whatever they 
were. I was lucky to have understanding parents. My father even 
nodded approvingly and said, not once but many times, that he 
could easily become a vegetarian. He never did, though.
The news spread quickly to the rest of my family. They, too, were 
surprised, but accepting—and like my father, they declined to 
join me. One day, after playing a round of golf, my brother-in-
law and I stopped at the clubhouse for some lunch. He ordered 
a burger; I had a salad, the only vegetarian option on the menu. 
As we ate, my brother-in-law commented, “The way animals 
are treated is pretty bad, but….” Then he shrugged and took 
another bite out of his burger. He didn’t seem ready to embrace 
my vegetarian philosophy, and I didn’t try to push it on him.
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I’ve never tried to push vegetarianism on an unwilling audience. 
Doing so, I’ve observed, only turns people off, and turning 
people off does nothing to reduce the suffering of animals. 
As my brother’s two vegan friends so clearly demonstrated, 
overzealousness, or the appearance of overzealousness, is 
counterproductive. However, when someone is willing to listen, 
I’m happy to share my thoughts. I’m also happy to listen, and 
respond, to those who disagree with me.
About the time I played the round of golf with my brother-in-law, 
one of my sisters and I had a spirited, but friendly, exchange of 
letters. My sister argued that plants as well as animals are capable 
of feeling pain. Thus, if it’s wrong to eat animals because animals 
feel pain, it must for the same reason be wrong to eat plants. But 
if it’s wrong to eat animals and it’s wrong to eat plants, there’s 
precious little left—salt comes to mind—that we may eat. Since 
we have to eat something, we may as well eat whatever we want. 
That includes animals.
When I asked my sister how she knew that plants can feel pain, 
she gave the example of the dandelion. Suppose, as I’m mowing 
my lawn, the blade of my lawnmower slices through the stalk of 
a dandelion. The yellow flower lies lifelessly on the ground. How 
does the plant respond? It not only grows a new flower but grows 
it lower to the ground, so that the next time I mow my lawn, 
the blade of my lawnmower slices through nothing but air. A 
clever plant, the dandelion! According to my sister, the dandelion 
grows its second flower lower to the ground in response to the 
pain it felt when it lost its first flower.
I objected to my sister’s argument in two ways. First, I expressed 
doubts that dandelions, or other plants, can feel pain. For one 
thing, plants lack a brain or nervous system, or anything that 
appears to serve the same function as a brain or nervous system. 
For another, it makes little sense that plants would evolve with 
the ability to feel pain, given that they’re rooted to the ground 
and have little opportunity to avoid painful stimuli. Imagine a 
fire sweeping across my lawn. The flames lick at my skin; I feel 
pain; I run away. But what about the dandelion? The flames lick 
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at its leaves; it feels pain … and then what? The plant can’t run 
away. How cruel nature would be to endow plants with the ability 
to feel pain when this ability does nothing to benefit them! But 
didn’t the ability to feel pain benefit the dandelion when I mowed 
my lawn? Not necessarily. Growing a second flower lower to the 
ground could be genetically hardwired, without the dandelion 
responding to pain.
Second, and more decisively, even if plants felt pain, and even 
if they felt pain as intensely as animals, it doesn’t follow that we 
may as well eat animals. Suppose we’re given a choice: we can eat 
a pound of chicken or a pound of grain. If we eat the chicken, 
the chicken (let’s assume) will suffer; if we eat the grain, the 
grain (let’s assume) will suffer. However, before we can eat the 
chicken, we must feed the chicken. To get one pound of chicken, 
we must feed the chicken two pounds of grain. Consequently, 
eating a pound of chicken will involve more suffering—that of 
the chicken as well as that of two pounds of grain—than will 
eating a pound of grain. If we wish to minimize suffering, we’d 
do better to be vegetarians—even on the assumption that plants 
can feel pain.
My sister is one of the most intelligent people I know. Yet the holes 
in her logic were gaping—every bit as gaping as the holes in my 
logic when I defended meat at my brother’s wedding reception. 
During my years as a vegetarian, I’ve often observed that, when 
the smell of meat is in the air, logic flies out the window.
�
Winter, 2012:
I sit at the entrance to the cave, reading Plato’s Republic. According 
to Plato, only what’s outside the cave is real; what’s inside is a mere 
imitation of reality. I look outside the cave, and then I look inside 
the cave. No. Plato got it nearly backwards. What’s real is inside 
the cave. What’s outside is a fiction, an ideal, the way things ought 
to be rather than the way things are. But it’s a useful fiction. Ideals 
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provide standards against which to measure the real world, and they 
can inspire people to make the real world better. We don’t live in a 
world of equality. But we could. I pledge to do my best to make the 
cave a better place for all of us.
Much has happened in the last two decades. More people know 
how food animals are raised and slaughtered, and more people 
have become conscientious omnivores, pescetarians, lacto-ovo 
vegetarians, and vegans. Even one of my brothers—not the 
one with the two vegan friends—turned vegetarian a couple 
of years ago. Today, moreover, there are more vegetarian and 
vegan restaurants, and many more restaurants offer at least one 
vegetarian option. The fake meat industry, too, has burgeoned, 
the quality of its products having improved markedly. In 1992, 
I tried products called Fakin’ Bacon and Phony Baloney. I could 
scarcely gag them down. Those days are long gone.
The conditions in which food animals are raised and slaughtered 
have in some respects also gotten better. Some cages and stalls, 
for instance, are now larger. But there’s still a long, long way 
to go. Battery cages, veal stalls, sow crates; beak trimming, 
cattle branding, tail docking; ammonia burn, mastitis, porcine 
stress syndrome; electrified baths, downers, desensitized or 
inexperienced slaughterhouse employees—these are just a few 
of the many problems that persist. In some respects, things 
have even gotten worse. For example, in 1987, about 5.3 billion 
chickens were slaughtered in the United States—a very large 
number. In more recent years, that number has climbed to 
around 9 billion.
I, too, have changed. In 1992, I ate cage-free eggs. They were more 
expensive than factory-farmed eggs, but I thought that eating 
them was ethically better. In this, I was right. However, ethically 
better doesn’t mean ethically unproblematic. Some years later, 
I learned that even cage-free eggs raise ethical concerns, since 
the chickens who provide cage-free eggs, although not kept in 
cages, are kept in crowded sheds, and their beaks are trimmed. I 
considered eating free-range eggs, but those were harder to find, 
and even free-range eggs aren’t free of ethical problems. Then a 
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miracle occurred. One summer, I started itching ferociously. My 
doctor, suspecting an allergic reaction, took a sample of my blood 
for analysis. The results came in: I was allergic to egg whites. I 
couldn’t have been more delighted. I gave up eggs altogether.
I now believe that the ideal diet is either vegan or nearly vegan. 
In practice, however, I’m not so strict. I sometimes eat dairy, 
especially cheese, though, when I do, I try to choose dairy 
that comes from cows who are treated reasonably humanely. 
Occasionally, a twinge of guilt tugs at me, but for the most part 
I think it’s okay not to be fanatical about what I eat. Perhaps one 
day another miracle will occur, and I’ll discover that I’m allergic 
to dairy.
For me, the important issue is not whether I should be a vegan 
or a lacto-ovo vegetarian—or a pescetarian or a conscientious 
omnivore. All of these are good choices. For me, what’s 
important is that factory farming come to an end. Reforming 
it isn’t enough. It’s an inherently unethical practice. As much as 
possible, we should all refuse to purchase and consume meat, 
eggs, and dairy that come from factory farms.
On August 1 of this year, I’ll celebrate my twentieth anniversary 
as a vegetarian. On that day, I’d like to dine at a vegetarian or 
vegan restaurant. I’ll eat like a pig.
�
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